During extreme …nancial crises, all of a sudden, the …nancial world that was once rife with pro…t opportunities for …nancial institutions (banks, for short) becomes exceedingly complex. Confusion and uncertainty follow, ravaging …nancial markets and triggering massive ‡ight-to-quality episodes. In this paper we propose a model of this phenomenon. In our model, banks normally collect information about their trading partners which assures them of the soundness of these relationships. However, when acute …nancial distress emerges in parts of the …nancial network, it is not enough to be informed about these partners, as it also becomes important to learn about the health of their trading partners. As conditions continue to deteriorate, banks must learn about the health of the trading partners of the trading partners of the trading partners, and so on. At some point, the cost of information gathering becomes too unmanageable for banks, uncertainty spikes, and they have no option but to withdraw from loan commitments and illiquid positions. A ‡ight-to-quality ensues, and the …nancial crisis spreads.
Introduction
The dramatic rise in investors' and banks' perceived uncertainty is at the core of the 2007-2009 U.S. …nancial crisis. All of a sudden, a …nancial world that was once rife with pro…t opportunities for …nancial institutions (banks, for short), was perceived to be exceedingly complex. Although the subprime shock was small relative to the …nancial institutions'capital, banks acted as if most of their counterparties were severely exposed to the shock (see Figure 1 ). Confusion and uncertainty followed, triggering the worst case of ‡ight-to-quality that we have seen in the U.S. since the Great Depression. The line corresponds to the TED spread in basis points (source: Bloomberg), the interest rate di¤erence between the interbank loans (3 month LIBOR) and the US government debt (3 month Treasury bills). An increase in the TED spread typically re ‡ects a higher perceived risk of default on interbank loans, that is, an increase in the banks'perceptions of counterparty risk.
In this paper we present a model of the sudden rise in complexity, followed by widespread panic in the …nancial sector. In the model, banks normally collect information about their direct trading partners which serves to assure them of the soundness of these relationships. However, when acute …nancial distress emerges in parts of the …nancial network, it is not enough to be informed about these partners, but it also becomes important for the banks to learn about the health of their trading partners. And as conditions continue to deteriorate, banks must learn about the health of the trading partners of the trading partners, of their trading partners, and so on. At some point, the cost of information gathering becomes too large and banks, now facing enormous uncertainty, choose to withdraw from loan commitments and illiquid positions. A ‡ight-to-quality ensues, and the …nancial crisis spreads.
The starting point of our framework is a standard liquidity model where banks (representing …nancial institutions more broadly) have bilateral linkages in order to insure against local liquidity shocks. The whole …nancial system is a complex network of linkages which functions smoothly in the environments that it is designed to handle, even though no bank knows with certainty all the many possible connections within the network (that is, each bank knows the identities of the other banks but not their exposures). However, these linkages may also be the source of contagion when an unexpected event of …nancial distress arises somewhere in the network. Our point of departure with the literature is that we use this contagion mechanism not as the main object of study but as the source of confusion and …nancial panic. During normal times, banks only need to understand the …nancial health of their neighbors, which they can learn at low cost. In contrast, when a signi…cant problem arises in parts of the network and the possibility of cascades arises, the number of nodes to be audited by each bank rises since it is possiblenetwork and describe a rare event as a perturbation to the structure of banks' shocks. Speci…cally, one bank su¤ers an unfamiliar liquidity shock for which it was unprepared. We next show that if banks can costlessly gather information about the network structure, the spreading of this shock into precautionary responses by other banks is typically contained. This scenario with no network uncertainty is the benchmark for our main results and is similar (although with an interior equilibrium) to Allen and Gale (2000) .
Our main contribution is in Section 3, where we make information gathering costly. In this context, if the cascade is small, either because the liquidity shock is limited or because banks'bu¤ers are signi…cant, banks are able to gather the information they need about their indirect exposure to the liquidity shock and we are back to the full information results of Section 2. However, once cascades are large enough, banks are unable to collect the information they need to rule out a severe indirect hit. Their response to this uncertainty is to hoard liquidity and to retrench on their lending, which triggers a credit crunch. In Section 4 we show that under certain conditions, the response in Section 3 can be so extreme, that the entire …nancial system can collapse as a result of the ‡ight to quality. The paper concludes with a …nal remarks section and several appendices.
The Environment and a Free-Information Benchmark
In this section we …rst introduce the environment and the characteristics of the …nancial network along with a shock which was unanticipated at the network formation stage (i.e. the …nancial network was not designed to deal with this shock). We next characterize the equilibrium for a benchmark case in which information gathering is free so that the market participants know the …nancial network.
The Environment
There are three dates f0; 1; 2g. There is a single good (one dollar) that serves as numeraire, which can be kept in liquid reserves or it can be loaned to production …rms. If kept in liquid reserves, a unit of the good yields one unit in the next date. Instead, if a unit is loaned to …rms at date 0, it then yields R > 1 units at date 2 if it is not unloaded before this date. At date 1, the lender can unload the loan (e.g. by settling it with the borrower at a discount) and receive r < 1 units. To simplify the notation, we assume r 0 throughout this paper.
Banks and Their Liquidity Needs
The economy has 2n continuums of banks denoted by fb j g 2n j=1 . Each of these continuums is composed of identical banks and, for simplicity, we refer to each continuum b j as bank b j , which is our unit of analysis. 1 Each bank b j has initial assets which consist of y units of liquid reserves set aside for liquidity payments, y 0 1 y units of ‡exible reserves set aside for making new loans at date 0 (but which can also be hoarded as liquid reserves) and 1 y y 0 units of loans. The bank's liabilities consist of a measure one of demand deposit contracts. A demand deposit contract pays l 1 > 1 at date 1 if the depositor is hit by a liquidity shock and l 2 > l 1 at date 2 if the depositor is not hit by a liquidity shock. Let ! j 2 [0; 1] be the measure of liquidity-driven depositors of bank b j (i.e. the size of the liquidity shock experienced by the bank), which takes one of the three values in f !;
, and suppose
Note that, if the size of the liquidity shock is !, the bank that loans all of its ‡exible reserves y 0 at date 0 has assets just enough to pay l 1 (resp. l 2 ) to early (resp. late) depositors. The central trade-o¤ in this economy will be whether the bank will loan its ‡exible reserves y 0 (which it set aside for this purpose) or whether it will hoard some of this liquidity as a precautionary response to a rare event that we describe below.
The Financial Network
The liquidity needs at date 1 may not be evenly distributed among banks, which highlights one of the (many) reasons for an interlinked …nancial network. Moreover, the main source of complexity later on will be confusion about the linkages between di¤erent banks. To capture this possibility we let i 2 f1; ::; 2ng denote slots in a …nancial network and consider a permutation : f1; ::; 2ng ! f1; ::; 2ng that assigns bank b (i) to slot i. We consider a …nancial network denoted by:
where the arc ! denotes that the bank in slot i (i.e., bank b (i) ) has a demand deposit in the bank in the subsequent slot i + 1 (i.e., bank
where we use modulo 2n arithmetic for the slot index i. 2 We refer to bank b (i+1) as the forward neighbor of bank b (i) (and similarly, to bank b (i) as the backward neighbor of bank b (i+1) ). The possibility of confusion arises later on from banks knowing the identity of other banks but not their particular linkages (i.e., the actual permutation ).
As we formally describe in Appendix A.1 (and similar to Allen-Gale (2000) ), in the normal environment, the …nancial network facilitates liquidity insurance and enables liquidity to ‡ow from banks that experience a low liquidity shock (! L ) to the banks that experience a high liquidity shock (! H ), even when the …nancial network b ( ) is unknown to the banks. Our focus is on the e¤ect of the …nancial interlinkages in case of an unanticipated shock for which the …nancial network is not necessarily designed for, which we describe next.
A Rare Event
At date 0 the banks learn that all banks will experience the average liquidity shock ! at date 1, however, they also learn that one bank, b j , becomes distressed and loses y of its liquid assets. As we formally demonstrate below, the losses in the distressed bank b j might spill over to the other banks via the …nancial network b ( ), thus the banks'knowledge of the …nancial network is potentially payo¤ relevant. In particular, this knowledge in ‡uences whether the banks use the ‡exible reserves y 0 to make new loans or to hoard liquidity. We are thus lead to describe the central feature of our model: the banks' uncertainty about the …nancial network b ( ).
Network Uncertainty and Auditing Technology
We let B = fb ( ) j : f1; ::; 2ng ! f1; ::; 2ng is a permutationg ,
denote the set of possible …nancial networks. Each bank b j observes its slot i = 1 (j) and the identities of the banks in its neighboring slots i 1 and i + 1. This information narrows down the potential networks to the set:
. 2 In particular, i represents the slot with index i 0 2 f1; ::; 2ng that is the modulo 2n equivalent of integer i. For example, i = 2n + 1 represents the slot with index 1. Note that the bank b j does not know how the remaining banks (b j ) j = 2f (i 1); (i); (i+1)g are assigned to the remaining slots (see Figure 2 ). In particular, each bank b j 6 = b j knows that the bank b j is distressed, but it does not necessarily know the slot
of the distressed bank. This is key, since it means that a bank b j 6 = b j does not necessarily know how far removed it is from the distressed bank. Each bank b j can acquire more information about the …nancial network through an auditing technology. At date 0, a bank b j in slot i (i.e. with j = (i)) can exert e¤ort to audit its forward neighbor b (i+1) in order to learn the identity of this bank's forward neighbor b (i+2) . Continuing this way, a bank b j that audits a number, a j , of balance sheets learns the identity of its a j + 1 forward neighbors and narrows the set of potential …nancial networks to:
(i 1) = (i 1) :::
We denote the posterior beliefs of bank b j with f j (: j ; a j ) which has support equal to
Assumption (FS). Each bank has a prior belief f j (:) over B with full support.
In the example illustrated in Figure 2 , if bank b 1 audits one balance sheet, then it would learn that bank b 3 is assigned to slot 3 and it would narrow down the set of networks to the two boxes at the left hand side of the bottom row in Figure 2 .
Bank Preferences and Equilibrium
Consider a bank b j and denote the bank's actual payments to early and late depositors by q until it can meet its liquidity obligations to depositors, that is, until q j 1 = l 1 . Increasing q j 1 beyond l 1 has no bene…t for the bank, thus once it satis…es its liquidity obligations, it then tries to maximize the return to the late depositors q j 2 . We capture this behavior with the following objective function
where v : R + ! R ++ is a strictly concave and strictly increasing function and d (:) is an increasing and convex function which captures the bank's non-monetary disutility from auditing. When the bank b j is making a decision that would lead to an uncertain outcome for q j 1 ; q j 2 (which will be the case in Section 3), then it maximizes the expectation of the expression in (4) given its posterior beliefs f j (: j ; a j ).
Suppose that the depositors' early/late liquidity shocks are observable, and a bank which is able to pay its late depositors at least l 1 at date 2 can refuse to pay the late depositors if they arrive early. 3 With this assumption, the continuation equilibrium for bank b j at date 1 takes one of two forms. Either there is a no-liquidation equilibrium in which the bank is solvent and pays
while the late depositors withdraw at date 2; or there is a liquidation equilibrium in which the bank is insolvent, unloads all outstanding loans, and pays
while all depositors (including the late depositors) draw their deposits at date 1. Figure 3 recaps the timeline of events in this economy. We formally de…ne the equilibrium as follows. De…nition 1. The equilibrium is a collection of bank auditing, liquidity hoarding, deposit withdrawal, and payment decisions
such that,
given the realization of the …nancial network b ( ) and the rare event, each bank b j maxi-mizes expected utility in (4) according to its prior belief f j (:) over B, the insolvent banks (with q j 1 ( ) < l 1 ) unload all of their outstanding loans at date 1 and the late depositors withdraw deposits early if and only if q j 2 ( ) < l 1 (cf. Eqs. (5) and (6)).
We next turn to the characterization of equilibrium. Note that for each …nancial network b ( ) and for each bank b j , there exists a unique k 2 f0; ::; 2n 1g such that
which we de…ne as the distance of bank b j from the distressed bank. As we will see, the distance k will be the payo¤ relevant information for a bank b j that decides how much liquidity to hoard at date 0 since it will determine whether or not the crisis that originates at the distressed bank b j will cascade to bank b j . The banks
respectively with distances 1; 0 and 2n 1, know their distances, but the remaining banks (with distances k 2 f2; ::; 2n 2g) do not have this information a priori and they assign a positive probability to eachk 2 f2; ::; 2n 2g (they rule outk 2 f1; 2n 1g by observing their forward and backwards neighbors). Note, however, that the bank b j can use the auditing technology to learn about the …nancial network and, in particular, about its distance from the distressed bank. A bank b ( { k) (with distance k) that audits a j 1 banks either learns its distance k (if k a j + 1) or it learns that k a j + 2.
In the remaining half of this section, we characterize the equilibrium in a benchmark case in which auditing is free so each bank learns its distance from the distressed bank. In subsequent sections, we characterize the equilibrium with costly audit and compare it with the free-information benchmark.
Free-Information Benchmark
We …rst describe a benchmark case in which auditing is free so each bank
In this context banks learn the whole …nancial network b ( ) and, in particular, their distances. At date 0 all banks anticipate receiving a liquidity shock, !, at date 1 and have liquid reserves equal to y = !l 1 (plus y 0 of ‡exible reserves), except for bank b j = b ( {) which has liquid reserves y . At date 1, the distressed bank b ( {) withdraws its deposits from the forward neighbor bank. As we show in Appendix A.2, this triggers further withdrawals until, in equilibrium, all cross deposits are withdrawn. That is
In particular, bank b ( ) tries, but cannot, obtain any net liquidity through cross withdrawals. The bank also cannot obtain any liquidity by unloading the loans at date 1, since each unit of unloaded loan yields r 0. Anticipating that it will not be able to obtain additional liquidity at date 1, the distressed bank b ( {) hoards some its ‡exible reserves y 0 by cutting new loans at date 0 in order to meet its liquidity demand at date 1.
In order to promise late depositors at least l 1 , a bank with no liquid reserves left at the end of date 1 must have at least 
that is, whenever its losses in liquid reserves are greater than its bu¤er. Suppose this is the case so bank b ( ) is insolvent. Anticipating insolvency, this bank will hoard as much liquidity as it can y
1 ) and unloads all remaining loans at date 1. Since the bank is insolvent, all depositors (including late depositors) arrive early and the bank pays
where recall that q We conjecture that, under appropriate parametric conditions, there exists a threshold K 2 f1; ::; 2n 2g such that all banks with distance k K 1 are insolvent (there are K such banks) while the banks with distance k K remain solvent. In other words, the crisis will partially cascade through the network but will be contained after K 2n 2 banks have failed. We refer to K as the cascade size. Under this conjecture, bank b ( +1) , which has a distance 2n 1, is solvent. Therefore
in Eq. (10) can be calculated explicitly. Consider now the bank b
( 1) with distance 1 from the distressed bank. To remain solvent, this bank needs to pay l 1 on its deposits to bank b ( 2) but it receives only q
in cross-deposits. Hence, bank b
( 1) will also go bankrupt if and only if its losses from cross-deposits are greater than its bu¤er,
> , which can be rewritten as
If this condition fails, then the only insolvent bank is the original distressed bank and the cascade size is K = 1. If this condition holds, then bank b ( 1) anticipates insolvency, it will hoard as much liquidity as it can, i.e. y
( 1) 0 = y 0 and it will pay all depositors
From this point onwards, a pattern emerges. The payment by an insolvent bank b
and this bank's backward neighbor b (i (k+1)) is also insolvent if and only if q
Hence, the payments of the insolvent banks converge to the …xed point of the function f (:) given by y + y 0 , and if
then (under Eq. (11)) there exists a unique K 2 such that
for each k 2 f0; ::; K 2g (14) and q
If 2n 2 is greater than the solution, K, to this equation, i.e. if from its forward neighbor) is solvent, since it can meet its losses from cross deposits by hoarding some liquidity while still promising the late depositors at least l 1 (i.e. q
with distance k 2 fK + 1; ::; 2n 1g are also solvent since they do not incur losses in crossdeposits. Hence these banks do not hoard any liquidity, y
= 0, and they pay q
= l 2 , verifying our conjecture for a partial cascade of size K under conditions (13) and (15) .
Since our goal is to study the role of network uncertainty in generating a credit crunch, we take the partial cascades as the benchmark. The next proposition summarizes the above discussion and also characterizes the aggregate level of liquidity hoarding, which we use as a benchmark in subsequent sections. Proposition 1. Suppose the …nancial network is realized as b ( ), auditing is free, and conditions (9), (13) and (15) hold. For a given …nancial network b ( ), let { = 1 (j)
denote the slot of the distressed bank.
(i) For the continuation equilibrium (at date 1): The banks' equilibrium payments
are (weakly) increasing with respect to their distance k from the distressed bank and there is a partial cascade of size K 2n 2 where K is de…ned by Eq. (14). In particular, banks b
(with distance from the distressed bank k K 1) are insolvent while the remaining banks b hoard as much liquidity as they can and unload all of their existing loans at date 1, while banks b
do not hoard any liquidity or unload any loans. Bank b ( K) hoards a level of liquidity
which is just enough to meet its losses from cross deposits (and does not unload any loans). The aggregate level of liquidity hoarding is:
Discussion. Proposition 1 shows that, under appropriate parametric conditions, the equilibrium features a partial cascade and the aggregate level of liquidity hoarding, F, is roughly linear in the size of the cascade K (and is roughly continuous in ). Figure 4 demonstrates this result for particular parameterization of the model. The top panel of the …gure plots the cascade size K as a function of the losses in the originating bank for di¤erent levels of the ‡exible reserves y 0 . This plot shows that the cascade size is increasing in the level of losses and decreasing in the level of ‡exible reserves y 0 . Intuitively, with a higher and a lower y 0 , there are more losses to be contained and the banks have less emergency reserves to counter these losses, thus increasing the spread of insolvency. The bottom panel plots the aggregate level of liquidity hoarding F, which is a measure of the severity of the credit crunch, as a function of . This plot shows that F also increases with and falls with y 0 . This is an intuitive result: In the free-information benchmark only the insolvent banks (and one transition bank) hoard liquidity, thus the more banks are insolvent (i.e. the greater K) the more liquidity is hoarded in the aggregate. Note also that F increases "smoothly"with .
These results o¤er a benchmark for the next sections. There we show that once auditing becomes costly, both K and F may be non-monotonic in y 0 and, more importantly, can jump with small increases in .
Endogenous Complexity and the Credit Crunch
We have now laid out the foundation for our main result. In this section we add the realistic assumption that auditing is costly and demonstrate that a massive credit crunch can arise in response to an endogenous increase in complexity once a bank in the network is su¢ ciently distressed. In other words, when K is large, it becomes too costly for banks to …gure out their indirect exposure. This means that their perceived uncertainty rises and they eventually respond by hoarding liquidity as a precautionary measure (i.e., F spikes).
Note that, unlike in Section 2.2, we cannot simplify the analysis by solving the equilibrium for a particular …nancial network b ( ) in isolation, since, even when the realization of the …nancial network is b ( ), each bank also assigns a positive probability to other …nancial networks b (~ ) 2 B. As such, for a consistent analysis we must describe the equilibrium for any realization of the …nancial network b ( ) 2 B (cf. De…nition 1).
Solving this problem in full generality is cumbersome but we make assumptions on the form of the adjustment cost function, the banks'objective function, and on the level of ‡exible reserves, that help simplify the exposition. First, we consider a convex and increasing cost function d (:) that satis…es
This means that banks can audit one balance sheet for free but it is very costly to audit the second balance sheet. In particular, given the bank's preferences in (4), the bank will never choose to audit the second balance sheet and thus each bank audits exactly one balance sheet,
. Given these audit decisions and the actual …nancial network b ( ), a bank b j has a posterior belief f j (:j ;1) with support B j ( ;1), which is the set of …nancial networks in which the bank j knows the identities of its neighbors and its second forward neighbor. In particular, the bank b 
On the other hand, each bank b ( k) with k 2 f3; ::; 2n 2g learns that its distance is at least 3 (i.e.k 3), but otherwise assigns a probability in (0; 1) to all distances k 2 f3; ::; 2n 2g. We denote the set of banks that are uncertain about their distance by
Second, we assume that the preference function v (:
with ! 1, so that the bank's objective is:
This means that banks evaluate their decisions according to the worst possible network realization, b (~ ), which they …nd plausible. The third and last assumption is that
That is, the bank has less ‡exible reserves than the natural limit on liquidity hoarding de…ned in Eq. (8) (which also implies that the bu¤er is given by = y 0 ). This condition ensures that, in the continuation equilibrium at date 1, the banks that have enough liquidity are also solvent (since, no matter how much of their ‡exible reserves they hoard, they have enough loans to pay the late depositors at least l 1 at date 2). We drop this condition in the next section. We next turn to the characterization of the equilibrium under these simplifying assumptions. The banks make their liquidity hoarding decision at date 0 and deposit withdrawal decision at date 1 under uncertainty (before their date 1 losses from cross-deposits are realized). At date 1 the distressed bank b ( {) withdraws its deposits from the forward neighbor which leads to the withdrawal of all cross deposits (see Eq. (7) and Appendix A.2) as in the free-information benchmark. Thus, for any distressed bank, the only way to obtain additional liquidity at date 1 is through hoarding liquidity at date 0, which we characterize next.
A Su¢ cient Statistic for Liquidity Hoarding. Consider a bank b ( { k) other than the original distressed bank (i.e., k > 0). A su¢ cient statistic for this bank to make the liquidity hoarding decision is q
l 1 , which is the amount it receives in equilibrium from its forward neighbor. In other words, to decide how much of its ‡exible reserves to hoard, this bank only needs to know whether (and how much) it will lose in cross-deposits. For example, if it knows with certainty that q
=z (i.e. its forward neighbor will pay so little that this bank will also be insolvent), then it hoards as much liquidity as it can, i.e. y
and q (
In words, a bank b ( { k) (with k > 0) hoards liquidity as if it will receive from its forward neighbor the lowest possible payment x m .
Distance Based and Monotonic Equilibrium. Next we de…ne two equilibrium allocation notions that are useful for further characterization. First, we say that the equilibrium allocation is distance based if the bank's equilibrium payment can be written only as a function of its distance k from the distressed bank, that is, if there exists payment functions Q 1 ; Q 2 : f0; ::; 2n 1g ! R such that
for all b ( ) 2 B and k 2 f0; ::; 2n 1g. Second, we say that a distance based equilibrium is monotonic if the payment functions Q 1 [k] ; Q 2 [k] are (weakly) increasing in k. In words, in a distance based and monotonic equilibrium, the banks that are further away from the distressed bank yield (weakly) higher payments.
We next conjecture that the equilibrium is distance based and monotonic (which we verify below). Then, a bank b ( { k) 's uncertainty about the forward neighbor's payment
reduces to its uncertainty about the forward neighbor's distance k 1, which is equal to one less than its own distance k. Hence, the problem in (21) can further be simpli…ed by substituting q
On the other hand, a bank b (i k) 2 B uncertain ( ) assigns a positive probability to all distancesk 2 f3; :::; 2n 2g. Moreover, since the equilibrium is monotonic, its forward neighbor's payment Q 1 hk 1 i is minimal for the distancek = 3, hence a bank
We are now in a position to state the main result of this section, which shows that all banks that are uncertain about their distances to the distressed bank hoard liquidity as if they are closer to the distressed bank than they actually are.
More speci…cally, all banks in B uncertain ( ) hoard the level of liquidity that the bank with distancek = 3 would hoard in the free-information benchmark. When the cascade size is su¢ ciently large (i.e. K 3) so that the bank with distancek = 3 in the freeinformation benchmark would hoard extensive liquidity, all banks in B uncertain ( ) with actual distances k > K also hoard large amounts of , even though they end up not needing it.
To state the result, we let y 
The proof of this result is relegated to Appendix A.2 since most of the intuition is provided in the discussion preceding the proposition. Among other features, the proof veri…es that the equilibrium allocation at date 1 is distance based and monotonic, and that the cascade size is the same as in the free-information benchmark. The date 0 liquidity hoarding decisions are characterized as in part (ii) since the payments Q 1 [k 1] for k 2 f1; 2; 2n 1g (that a bank b ( { k) 2 B know ( ) with k > 0 expects to receive) and the payment Q 1 [2] (that the banks in B uncertain ( ) e¤ectively expect to receive) are the same as their counterparts in the free-information benchmark.
Discussion. The plots in Figure 5 are the equivalent to those in the free-information case portrayed in Figure 4 . The top panel plots the cascade size K as a function of the losses in the originating bank . The parameters satisfy condition (19) so that the cascade size in this case is the same as the cascade size in the free-information benchmark characterized in Proposition 1, and both …gures coincide. The key di¤erences are in the bottom panel, which plots the aggregate level of liquidity hoarding F as a function of . The solid lines correspond to the costly audit equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2, while the dashed lines reproduce the free-information benchmark also plotted in Figure 4 . These plots demonstrate that, for low levels of K (i.e. for K < 3), the aggregate level of liquidity hoarding with costly-auditing is the same as the free-information benchmark, in particular, it increases roughly continuously with . As K switches from below 3 to above 3, the liquidity hoarding in the costly audit equilibrium make a very large and discontinuous jump. That is, when the losses (measuring the severity of the initial shock) are beyond a threshold, the cascade size becomes so large that banks are unable to tell whether they are connected to the distressed bank. All uncertain banks act as if they are closer to the distressed bank than they actually are, hoarding much more liquidity than in the free-information benchmark and leading to a severe credit crunch episode. This is our main result. Note also that the aggregate level of liquidity hoarding (and the severity of the credit crunch) is not necessarily monotonic in the level of ‡exible reserves y 0 . For example, when = 0:5, Figure 5 shows that providing more ‡exibility to the banks by increasing y 0 actually increases the level of aggregate liquidity hoarding. That is, at low levels of , an increase in ‡exibility stabilizes the system but the opposite may take place when the shock is su¢ ciently large. Intuitively, if the increase in ‡exibility is not su¢ cient to contain the …nancial panic (by reducing the cascade size to manageable levels), more ‡exibility back…res since it enables banks to hoard more liquidity and therefore exacerbate the credit crunch.
The Collapse of the Financial System
Until now, the uncertainty that arises from endogenous complexity a¤ects the extent of the credit crunch but not the number of banks that are insolvent, K. In this section we show that if banks have "too much" ‡exibility, in the sense that condition (19) no longer holds and
(which also implies = y n 0 ), then the rise in uncertainty itself can increase the number of insolvent banks.
The reason is that a large precautionary liquidity hoarding compromises banks'long run pro…tability by giving up high return R for low return 1. In this context, even if the worst outcome anticipated by a bank does not materialize, it may still become insolvent if su¢ ciently close (but farther than K) from the distressed bank. In other words, a bank's large precautionary reaction improves its liquidation outcome when very close to the distressed bank but it does so at the cost of raising its vulnerability with respect to more benign scenarios. Since ex-post a large number of banks may …nd themselves in the latter situation, there can be a signi…cant rise in the number of insolvencies as a result of the additional ‡exibility.
The analysis is very similar to that in the previous section. In particular, a bank's payment still depends on its choice y ) is not satis…ed. In particular, these functions are identical to those in (26) and (27) in Appendix A.2 (as in Section 3) but now there is an additional insolvency region:
The critical new element is the bound y
. This is a function of the losses from cross-deposits and is calculated as the level of liquidity hoarding above which the bank's loans and liquid reserves (net of losses) would not be su¢ cient to pay the late depositors at least l 1 . That is, y
We refer to scenarios where y (l 1 x) z (since K 3, the banks in B uncertain ( ) have su¢ cient liquid reserves at date 1) leads to
Note also that condition (19) implies y j 0 y 0 y n 0 and thus rules out precautionary insolvencies by the above steps.
cross-deposits. To analyze this case, …rst note that the bound y u 0 [(l 1 x) z] is decreasing in (l 1 x) z, and thus increasing in x. That is, the more a bank receives from its forward neighbor, the higher the bound above which it will experience a precautionary insolvency. Second, note the inequality, y u 0 [0] < 1 y (which follows from some algebra and using l 2 =l 1 < R). Then, there are two subcases to consider depending on whether or not the level of ‡exible reserves y 0 is greater than y 
In this case, a bank b j that hoards y 0 of liquidity is insolvent if and only if it receives from its forward neighbor
. By a similar analysis to that in Section 2.2 for the partial cascades (which we carry out in Appendix A. o are solvent. In other words, there is a partial cascade which is at least as large as (and potentially greater than) the partial cascade in the free-information benchmark.
We summarize our …ndings in the following proposition. 6 Proposition 3. Suppose assumptions (FS), (17) and (18) are satis…ed and conditions (9), (13), (15) hold. Suppose also that condition (24) (which is the opposite of condition 6 Given the possibility of precautionary insolvencies, one may also wonder whether there could be multiple equilibria due to banks'coordination failures. Suppose, for example, K = 3, so that the crisis is contained after 3 banks fail. Could there also be a bad equilibrium in which all banks hoard the maximum level of liquidity, and their liquidity hoarding decisions are justi…ed since their forward neighbors also hoard the maximum level of liquidity and experience a precautionary insolvency (thus paying a small q This kind of coordination failure is not possible in our setup, precisely because of conditions (13) and (15) . These conditions ensure that bank b ( {+1) is always solvent, even if all other banks hoard the maximum level of liquidity and experience precautionary insolvencies. To see this, note that the losses from cross-deposits decrease as we move away from the distressed bank and eventually q
=z. Since bank b ( {+1) expects to receive at least l 1 =z from its forward neighbor, it can avoid insolvency by hoarding an intermediate level of liquidity. Hence, it is never optimal for bank b ( {+1) to undergo a precautionary insolvency. But once we …x q ( {+1) = l 1 , the rest of the equilibrium is uniquely determined as described above, that is, there is no coordination failure among banks. Discussion. Figure 6 plots the cascade sizeK as a function of , for di¤erent levels of the ‡exible reserves y 0 . For comparison, the dashed lines plot the cascade size K in the free-information benchmark for the same parameters. The top panel corresponds to the case in which y 0 y n 0 , i.e. when condition (19) holds. By Proposition 2, in this case there are no precautionary insolvencies and the cascade size is the same as the cascade size in the free-information benchmark. The second panel corresponds to a higher level of y 0 that satis…es y 0 > y n 0 . In this case, precautionary insolvencies are possible, and for su¢ ciently large more banks are insolvent in the costly audit benchmark than in the free-information benchmark, i.e.K > K. The third panel shows that, as we increase y 0 , a su¢ ciently large shock may trigger a collapse of the whole …nancial system (i.e., K = 2n 1).
The bottom panel in Figure 6 shows that as y 0 continues to rise, then at some point the ampli…cation disappears and againK = K. That is, the e¤ect of the ‡exible reserves y 0 on the size of the cascadeK is non-monotonic: The whole …nancial system collapses with an intermediate level of y 0 , but the health of the …nancial system is restored (and, in fact, is stronger) with su¢ ciently high levels of y 0 . The intuition for this non-monotonicity is the same as the intuition for the non-monotonic e¤ect of y 0 on F. Increasing the level of ‡exible reserves y 0 reduces the cascade size K in the free-information benchmark. If this increase in ‡exibility is not su¢ ciently large, K does not fall to manageable levels and the …nancial panic remains. As long as there is a …nancial panic, the increase in y 0 back…res and, in the current case, it also ampli…es the cascade by generating more precautionary insolvencies. However, if the increase in y 0 is su¢ ciently large, it may end the …nancial panic and restore the health of the …nancial system.
Final Remarks
Our model captures what appears to be a central feature of …nancial panics: During severe …nancial crises the complexity of the environment rises dramatically, and this in itself causes confusion and …nancial retrenchment. The perception of counterparty risk arises even in transactions among apparently sound …nancial institutions engaged in long term relationships. All of a sudden, economic agents are faced with massive uncertainty as things are no longer business-as-usual. The collapse of Lehman Brothers during the current …nancial crisis is one such instance, which froze essentially all private credit markets and triggered massive run downs of credit lines and withdrawals even from the safest money market funds.
In the model we capture the complexity of the environment with the size of the partial cascades. When these cascades are small, banks only need to understand the …nancial health of their immediate neighbors to make their decisions. In contrast, when …nancial conditions worsen and cascades grow, banks need to understand and be informed about a larger share of the network. At some point, this is simply too costly and banks withdraw from intermediation rather than risk exposure to enormous uncertainty, which triggers a ‡ight to quality. We also showed that banks' ‡exibility, de…ned as their ability to hoard liquidity by not extending new loans or by selling illiquid assets while in distress, makes it harder for large cascades to develop, but if they do develop they can trigger more severe credit crunches and even a collapse in the …nancial system. Intuitively, a gain in ‡exibility is very useful if it succeeds in containing panic, but it can be counterproductive if it does not as it facilitates banks'withdrawal from intermediation.
An aspect we did not explore in this paper but one which we are currently pursuing in a related work, is that of secondary markets for loans at date 0. Our preliminary …ndings point to yet another ampli…cation aspect of the mechanism we highlight in this paper: With full information, the distant banks (i.e., the banks with k > K) are the natural buyers of the loans sold by the distressed banks. However, once distant banks face uncertainty and become worried that they may be too close to the distressed bank, they cease to buy loans from these banks as they would rather hoard their liquidity, which exacerbates the network's distress.
There are some obvious policy conclusions that emerge from our framework. For example, there is clearly scope for having banks hold a larger bu¤er than they would be privately inclined to do. Also, transparency measures, by reducing the cost of gathering information, increase the resilience of the system to a lengthening in potential cascades. There is even an argument to limit banks' ‡exibility to cut loan commitments. However, we are interested in going beyond these observations, and in particular in exploring the impact of policies that modify the structure of the network. For example, there is an emerging consensus that the prevalence of bilateral OTC markets for CDS transactions compounded the confusion and complexity of the current …nancial crisis, and that it is imperative to organize these transactions in well capitalized exchanges to prevent a recurrence. Our framework can help with the formal analysis of this type of policy considerations. We leave this analysis for future research.
A Appendix

A.1 The Normal Environment
The analysis in the text characterizes the equilibrium following a rare event for which the …nancial network is not prepared. In this Appendix, we describe the functioning of the …nancial network in the normal environment. In particular, we show that the …nancial network enables the banks to insure against heterogenous liquidity shocks and facilitates the ‡ow of liquidity across banks, even if the banks are uncertain about the network structure.
In the normal environment, there are three aggregate states of the world, denoted by s (0), s (r) and s (g), revealed at date 0. In state s (0) all banks expect to receive at date 1 the same liquidity shock !. The states s (r) and s (g) are realized with equal probability and the liquidity shocks in these states are heterogeneous across banks. More speci…cally, the banks are divided half and half between two types: red and green. In state s (r) (resp. s (g)), the banks with red type (resp. green type) expect to receive a high liquidity shock, ! H , and the other banks expect to receive a low liquidity shock, ! L . This means that in states s (r) and s (g) there is enough aggregate liquidity but there is a need to transfer liquidity across banks. To transfer liquidity in states s (r) and s (g), the banks form the …nancial network of bilateral deposits in (1). We say that the …nancial network is consistent if all odd slots (resp. all even slots) contain banks of the same type, which means that red and green type banks alternate around the …nancial circle. We restrict the set of feasible networks to consistent ones (as opposed to, for example, any circular network in which banks may be arbitrarily ordered around the circle), since these networks ensure that each bank that needs liquidity has deposits on a bank with excess liquidity, facilitating bilateral liquidity insurance (see below) with the minimally required level of cross-deposits z in (2).
Banks' types and the …nancial network are realized as follows: First the types of banks are realized at random (half of the banks become red type and the other half green type); then a particular consistent …nancial network b ( ) (with respect to these types) is realized. Banks'types are their private information, thus the set B in (3) represents the set of consistent …nancial networks from an ex-ante point of view (i.e. before the types of the banks are realized). This shock structure ensures that the actual realization of the …nancial network is always consistent while the banks' uncertainty about the …nancial network is still described as in the rare event case. In particular, a bank b j observes the slots of its neighbors (and since the network is consistent, it also indirectly learns the types of its neighbors), but it does not know the slots (or the types) of the remaining banks (b j ) j = 2f (i 1); (i); (i+1)g (see Figure 2 ). By auditing a j balance sheets, the bank can further narrow down the set of possible networks to B j ( j a j ). Figure 7 recaps the timeline of events in this economy both for the normal environment and the rare event analyzed in the main text. Note that the rare event analyzed in the main text is characterized by an unanticipated aggregate state s j (0) which is very similar to one of the states in the normal environment (i.e. the state s (0)) except for the fact that one bank, b j , becomes distressed and loses of its liquid reserves.
The equilibrium in the normal environment is a collection of bank auditing, liquidity hoarding, deposit withdrawal, and payment decisions h a j ( ) ; y
such that, for each realization of the …nancial network b ( ) and the aggregate state in fs (0) ; s (r) ; s (g)g, each bank b j makes decisions that maximize the preferences in (4), and the late depositors withdraw deposits early if and only if q j 2 < l 1 (cf. Eqs. (5) and (6)). We next characterize this equilibrium.
The Normal Functioning of the Financial Network. We claim that, in the normal environment, the …nancial network facilitates liquidity ‡ow and enables each bank b j to pay the contracted values q j 1 = l 1 ; q j 2 = l 2 in each state of the world. Suppose that a consistent …nancial network, b ( ) and state s (r) is realized, and suppose without loss of generality that red type banks are assigned to odd slots (the case in which red type banks are assigned to even slots is symmetric). It su¢ ces to prove the statement for this case since the case in which s (g) is realized is symmetric to the s (r) case, and the case in which s (0) is realized is trivial. We conjecture (and verify below) that each bank b j chooses not to audit (for any positive audit costs d (:) > 0) and hoards no liquidity, i.e. a j = 0 and y j 0 = 0. Consider the equilibrium at date 1. A red type bank, b (2i 1) , (which is assigned to an odd slot by assumption) needs liquidity so it draws its deposits from the forward neighbor bank, i.e. chooses z (2i 1) = z. For each green type bank, b (2i) , regardless of the …nancial network in B (2i) ( ), drawing z (2i) 2 [0; z] deposits leads to the payments q (2i) = l 1 and
Since l 2 > l 1 and the preferences are given by (4), the green type banks do not draw their deposits regardless of their beliefs f (2i) (: j ), i.e. they choose z (2i) = 0. It follows that liquidity ‡ows through the network at date 1 even though each bank is uncertain about the network structure. In particular, each bank b j pays the contracted values q j 1 = l 1 ; q j 2 = l 2 in state s (r) (and similarly in states s (g) and s (0)).
We next consider the equilibrium at date 0 and verify our conjecture that the banks choose not to audit and not to hoard any liquidity. First note that a bank b (i) in need of liquidity at date 1 is able to obtain it by withdrawing its deposits in the forward neighbor at a cost of l 2 =l 1 units at date 2 for each unit of liquidity. The bank could also obtain liquidity by hoarding ‡exible reserves at date 0 but this would cost R > l 2 =l 1 units for each unit of liquidity (since R > l 2 > l 1 > 1). Therefore, each bank b (i) optimally chooses not to hoard any liquidity at date 0. Second note that a bank's, b (i) , optimal actions (for liquidity hoarding at date 0 and deposit withdrawal at date 1) only depend on its slot i (and only on its parity), and in particular, it is independent of the …nancial network in B (i) ( ). Thus the bank does not bene…t from auditing and optimally chooses not to audit, 
The …rst case characterizes the payment when the bank's losses from cross-deposits do not exceed its bu¤er and the bank has hoarded enough ‡exible reserves to counter these losses. In this case, the bank is solvent and pays according to (26). The second case characterizes the payment when the bank's losses from cross-deposits exceed its bu¤er, or when the losses do not exceed the bu¤er but the bank has not hoarded enough ‡exible reserves to counter these losses. In this case, the bank is insolvent and pays according to (27).
Proof of Proposition 2. First consider part (i) taking as given the characterization of the liquidity hoarding decisions in part (ii). Note that the liquidity hoarding decision of each bank depends only on its distance from the distressed bank, which implies that the payments of banks in the continuation equilibrium can be written as a function of their distances, i.e. that the equilibrium is distance based. The characterization in part (ii) shows that each bank b ( { k) 2 b ( {) ; b ( { 1) ; ::; b ( { (K 1)) that would be insolvent in the free-information benchmark hoards y j 0 = y 0 , and thus it pays the same allocation it would pay in the free-information benchmark:
2;f ree ( ) = 0 for k 2 f0; ::; K 1g .
The bank b ( { K) hoards at least as much liquidity as it would hoard in the free-information benchmark, thus it is solvent given condition (19) (which ensures that hoarding too much liquidity does not cause insolvency) and pays (cf. Eq. (26)): analysis implies that the equilibrium is distance based and monotonic, completing the characterization of the date 1 equilibrium in this case.
